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CORRESPONDENCE

Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes
Lyman Johnson*
& David Millon**

In a recent article in this journal, Professor Richard Booth offers
an extended appraisal of state legislation regulating hostile corporate
takeovers. 1 Since 1982, at least twenty-nine states have enacted one or
more of the several standard statutory responses to this important and
troubling phenomenon. 2 Booth evaluates these laws according to their
efficacy in addressing a particular problem confronted by target company shareholders in takeover contests - the coercive effects of twotier or partial bids. Coercion to tender in these kinds of bids is said to
occur when shareholders are faced with a choice between accepting a
premium, which may be less than optimally attractive, or, on the other
hand, holding out but facing the prospect of a later cash-out at a much
lower price or, worse yet, continuing to own a minority position in a
"captive company" (p. 1641). Booth concludes that only one of the
several current forms of takeover statutes adequately addresses this
problem, the so-called control share acquisition statute. This type of
statute, an ·example of which was vindicated against constitutional attack in the recent CTS case,3 Booth describes as "a remarkably intelligent approach to the problem of fairness in tender offers" (p. 1681).
We think Booth's article requires comment for two reasons. The
first reason is perhaps more obvious, though less interesting from our
point of view. To be blunt, "unfairness" to shareholders due to coercion arising out of two-tier or partial offers simply does not occur with
enough frequency to warrant a sixty-seven-page article in a major law
review. According to recent congressional testimony by SEC Com-

* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. B.A. 1973, Carleton College;
J.D. 1978, University of Minnesota. - Ed.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. B.A. 1975, M.A. 1976,
Ohio State University; M.A. 1978, Ph.D. 1982, Cornell University; J.D. 1983, Harvard University. - Ed.
1. Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (1988). Subse·
quent references to Booth's article will be enclosed in parentheses in the text.
2. See Grippo, In Defense of State Takeover Laws, 8 N. ILL. L. REV. 273, 273 n.4 (1988).
For a summary of the characteristics of the various forms of takeover statutes, see Booth, supra
note 1, at 1670-81.
·
3. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
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missioner Cox, from 1982 to 1986 the number of two-tier offers declined from 18% of all bids to only 3%;4 only six occurred in 1987.5
An earlier SEC empirical study indicates that these developments are
part of a trend in favor of "any-or-all, all-cash" bids. The SEC found
that the incidence of such bids relative to two-tier or partial offers increased steadily from 1981 to 1984; only seven of the eighty-two at
least partially successful cash tender offers launched in 1984 were twotier and only nine were partial. 6 In Cox's words, "the market appears
to have corrected any problem that may have existed."7 So, even if
shareholder coercion were an explanation for state takeover statutes,
given the practical insignificance of the problem, coercion would
hardly seem a suitable justification for these laws.
This troublesome aspect of Booth's article is related to what we
think is a more important fl.aw, a fl.aw that, regrettably, characterizes
much of what's being written about takeover statutes. In a nutshell,
the article identifies a particular threat (coercion) to shareholder financial welfare and then proceeds to analyze how well the states have
addressed that concern. This analysis takes for granted that shareholder welfare provides a meaningful standard against which to assess
state takeover laws. Of course, Booth is not alone in taking this approach. His is just one of many pieces that focus on whether shareholders gain or lose from takeover laws because that standard is
assumed to be the relevant evaluative standard. 8 By using shareholder
welfare as the benchmark for evaluation, commentators like these
4. Mendelsohn & Berg, Anti-Takeover Bill Would Shift Balance ofPower, Natl. L.J., Feb. 8,
1988, at 38, 40 (citing statement of SEC Chairman Charles C. Cox before the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, June 23, 1987).

5. Id. at n.21.
6. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF EcONOMIST, SEC, THE EcONOMICS OF ANY·OR·ALL, PARTIAL,
AND Two-TIER TENDER OFFERS 14-15 & Table la (Apr. 19, 1985). This study also presented
evidence suggesting that those two-tier offers that do occur are not coercive in any event. During
the period covered by the study, fewer shareholders responded to two-tier and partial offers than
to any-or-all bids. Id. at 20-22 & Table 9. Booth cites this study but does not comment on its
findings of infrequency and lack of coercion. Booth, supra note 1, at 1643.
7. Mendelsohn & Berg, supra note 4, at 40. The Delaware Chancery Court recently referred
to partial offers as "a largely vanished breed." City Capital Assocs. Partnership v. Interco Inc.,
C.A. No. 10105, slip op. at 23 (Del. Ch. Nov. l, 1988) (on appeal). The present "dormant"
status of two-tier and partial offers is probably related to the recent explosion in the availability
of so-called junk bond financing. See Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age ofFinance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1987).
8. See, e.g., Block, Barton & Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The "Second Generation," 13
SEC. REG. L.J. 332 (1986); Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L.
REV. 563, 619-26 (1983); Pozen, The New Round ofState Tender Offer Statutes, 53 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 89 (1987); Steinberg, Tender Offer Regulation: The Need/or Reform, 23 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 1 (1988); Comment, State Antitakeover Legislation: Unconstitutional Economic Folly, 20
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 475 (1988); Note, Second Generation State Takeover Statutes and Shareholder
Wealth: An Empirical Study, 97 YALE L.J. 1193 (1988).
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carry on the tradition of the many articles that have criticized management defensive tactics in hostile takeovers. 9 The shareholder welfare
standard made sense in that area because, at least in theory, state statutory and common law accords shareholders a position of preeminence within the corporation law universe. It is a mistake, however, to
apply that standard to state takeover laws because these statutes represent a deliberate rejection of the shareholder primacy norm.
The obsession with the shareholder welfare criterion misses the
point of what the states that pass these statutes are really doing. State
takeover laws are antitakeover laws. Their principal aim is not to
maximize share values for target company investors, whether by eliminating coercion or otherwise, and no apology can alter that fact. Instead, their chief purpose is to protect non shareholders from the
disruptive impact of the corporate restructurings that are thought typically to result from hostile takeovers. Rightly or wrongly, state legislators perceive that hostile takeovers cause lost jobs, destruction of
established supplier and customer relationships, and loss of tax revenues and charitable contributions. Restricting the level of takeover
activity is one way of addressing these concerns - but that approach
necessarily causes shareholders to lose opportunities to realize takeover premiums while also reducing whatever accountability incentives
a credible takeover threat might impose on corporate management.
Consequently, to criticize (or defend) state takeover laws for failure (or success) in protecting shareholder financial interests is to apply
a standard that, when one pierces their rhetoric, state legislators have
themselves decided to disregard by choosing instead to pursue objectives that are largely inconsistent with shareholder welfare. It's as if
one were to criticize horses because they can't fly. Of course they
can't - but then they weren't designed to. Nevertheless, Booth analyzes each of the various forms of takeover law for signs of air-worthiness. His contribution, apparently, is his discovery that at least one
type (the control share acquisition statute) is not entirely earthbound.
The "promise" of state takeover laws is the unintended possibility that
some horses, defying their nature, might actually fly after all.
Despite the preoccupation of Booth and others with the wrong
standard, there isn't anything mysterious about what the states are
doing. For example, a statute amending North Carolina's so-called
"Shareholder Protection Act" includes this preamble:
Whereas, takeovers and takeover attempts of corporations in North
Carolina have been occurring with increasing frequency; and
9. The seminal article, of course, was Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer. 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981).
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Whereas, such activity can be highly disruptive to communities
within North Carolina by causing, among other things, high unemployment and erosion of the State and local economy and tax base; and
Whereas, many of these corporations are not presently subject to the
North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act since while substantially
present in North Carolina they are chartered elsewhere; and
Whereas, these corporations offer employment to a large number of
North Carolina citizens who pay income taxes, property and other taxes
in this State; and
Whereas, these corporations pay significant amounts of income taxes
to North Carolina; and
Whereas, these corporations pay substantial State and local property
taxes; and
Whereas, these corporations pay substantial sales and use taxes in
North Carolina; and
Whereas, these corporations provide their North Carolina employees
with health, retirement and other benefits; and
Whereas, these corporations and their employees contribute greatly
to community projects in North Carolina; and
Whereas, many unrelated businesses rely on these corporations to
purchase goods and services; and
Whereas, North Carolina has a vital interest in providing to these
corporations the benefits of the provisions of the North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act . . . .10

Note the conspicuous absence of any reference to the interests of
shareholders.
North Carolina legislators are not alone in their concerns about
noninvestors. Connecticut recently passed a takeover law that empowers something called the Connecticut Partnership Compact which is to include representatives of labor and citizen groups, as well
as business and the legislature - to impose conditions on certain posttakeover transactions for the benefit of various nonshareholder interests.11 Wisconsin's statute candidly declares that Wisconsin corporations "encompass, represent and affect, through their ongoing business
operations a variety of constituencies including shareholders, employes, customers, suppliers and local communities and their economies" and states further that it is intended "to promote the welfare of
these constituencies" and "should allow for the stable, long-term
growth of resident domestic corporations." 12 Most notably, several
states have adopted provisions that expressly empower a corporation's
board of directors to take into account nonshareholder interests in re10. 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 124.
11. 1988 Conn. Legis. Serv. 88-350, § 6 (West). See Connecticut Takeover Statute Barring
Raiders Signed into Law, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 925 (June 17, 1988).
12. 1987 Wis. Laws 45.
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sponding to takeover bids. For example, a Minnesota statute states
that "a director may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the corporation's employees, customers,
suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as shortterm interests of the corporation and its shareholders including the
possibility that these interests might be served by the continued independence of the corporation."I 3 So far, Indiana, Illinois, Maine, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania have passed similar laws. I4 Arizona actually makes
consideration of nonshareholder interests mandatory. Is
The legislative history of New York's takeover statuteI 6- which
has served as a sort of model act for several recent enactments in other
states - clearly indicates that its purpose is to protect nonshareholders. The official memorandum that accompanied the bill refers to New
York's desire to avoid the disruptive effects of takeovers on target
company employees and on local communities in which targets do
business. Thus, the memorandum anticipates that the new law will
encourage commitment to the welfare of New York corporations and
their employees and refers to promotion of "long-term growth."I 7 In
other words, it was hoped that the statute would discourage hostile
bidders from taking actions that threaten the continuity of target company operations. This rationale explained the AFL-CIO's public support for the measure; a "Support Memorandum" stated that "[n]o
matter which side wins control in a takeover battle, workers, customers, and the community in which the company is located are the likely
ultimate losers."I 8
Even where express statutory language or legislative history does
not reveal the legislature's real objectives, the very design of the takeover statute often does. Several states, including Delaware and New
York, have enacted so-called business combination statutes. I9 These
13. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251, subdiv. 5 (West Supp. 1988).
14. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (West Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (Supp. 1987); OHIO REV.
CoDE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Baldwin Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8363(b) (Purdon
Supp. 1988).
15. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (West Supp. 1987).
16. See infra text accompanying note 19.
17. See Governor's Program Bill, 1985 Extraordinary Session, Memorandum (ch. 915) 1, 6,
9 (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review).
18. AFL-CIO Memorandum (Dec. 10, 1985) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review).
The Business Council of New York supported the bill for similar reasons. See The Business
Council of New York State, Press Release, Business Council Urges Passage of Takeover Bill (Dec.
10, 1985) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review).
19. See Del. Antitakeover Law of Feb 2, 1988, ch. 204, § 203 (CCH); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
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statutes impose a moratorium on certain post-takeover transactions such as mergers, substantial asset sales, and liquidations -. absent approval by target company management. 20 As Booth acknowledges
(p.1668), they cannot be interpreted as shareholder protection enactments for several reasons. First, by vesting dispositive decisionmaking
power in the target company's board rather than in its shareholders,
these statutes seem to contemplate that at least some tender offers will
be rejected even though they might have elicited a favorable response
from the shareholders. Second, one possible rationale for board empowerment - protection of shareholders from coercive bids - does
not explain the statutes' broad coverage, which is not confined to situations in which coercion seems likely. Third, even if they did provide
some measure of shareholder protection by strengthening management's bargaining position ex post, the statutes' likely ex ante chilling
effect on the frequency of hostile tender offers may counteract that
benefit (if it is a benefit) and thereby disserve shareholder welfare. Finally, the focus on those post-acquisition transactions that motivate
"bust-up" takeovers - substantial asset sales and the like - indicates
that the real objective is to deter such bids, despite their value to shareholders. An acquirer that is willing to use its power of control in some
less disruptive manner, as by continuing existing operations, for example, should not be deterred by the moratorium on business
combinations.
The antitakeover aspect of the control share acquisition statutes,
which are analyzed at length by Booth (pp. 1678-99), is perhaps less
apparent but is there nevertheless. The Indiana statute at issue in
CTS, which is typical of the breed, conditions the successful bidder's
post-acquisition voting rights on majority approval by all "disinterested" shares, that is, excluding those held or controlled by the acquirer and by inside directors and officers of the target company. This
approval mechanism creates a fifty-day delay before an offer might be
consummated, a period during which target company management
might seek - indeed might be required by its common law fiduciary
obligation to seek - competing offers or take other value-enhancing
measures. The statute also confers post-acquisition redemption rights
§ 912 (McKinney 1986). So far, Arizona, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, and Wisconsin have passed similar laws.
20. Delaware's statute is unique in including an additional exception for takeovers that result
in acquisitions of at least 85% of target company stock. Del. Antitakeover Law of Feb 2, 1988,
ch. 204, § 203(a)(2) (CCH). The SEC takes the position that this exception is of very limited
practical importance because tender offers rarely generate that favorable a response. See BNS
Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 471 (D. Del. 1988); RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley
Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476, 482-83 (D. Del. 1988).
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on nontendering shareholders. Accepting for the moment that target
company ,shareholders might benefit from a control share acquisition
statute once a "coercive" takeover bid has been launched, 21 there is
nevertheless another dimension to the shareholder welfare question.
By conditioning voting rights on approval of disinterested shareholders, imposing significant delay, and creating a redemption right for
nontendering shareholders, these statutes place substantial obstacles in
the path of the hostile bidder. As such, one possible effect of control
share acquisition statutes is the deterrence of hostile bids, at least to a
certain extent, by raising their costs. Deterrence, of course, harms
shareholders as a class because they are less likely to receive the benefits of takeovers. Judge Posner considered this ex ante deterrent effect
so potent as to refer to the Indiana statute as a "lethal dose" for hostile
takeovers. 22 In the words of one commentator, "There is little doubt
that the [Indiana control share acquisition] statute's purpose was to
discourage tender offers ...." 23 The intended beneficiaries of this
policy were, of course, Indiana nonshareholders deemed likely to suffer from the harmful effects of hostile bids. Thus, even if control share
acquisition and other takeover statutes fail to achieve their policy
objectives, and high levels of takeover activity continue to benefit
shareholders, that result will occur in spite of, not because of, state
legislation.
Though the real objectives of state takeover laws should be clear to
everyone by now, some commentators continue to dismiss them as
nothing more than "shameless" management-entrenchment devices
passed by compliant legislators at the behest of politically influential
firms. 24 In fact, recent Wisconsin legislation was the product of a
21. In this regard, Booth seeks to make the rather obvious point that the statute effectively
addresses the collective action problem that two-tier and partial offers present. Pp. 1688-89. His
reading of the statute may be overly optimistic. If the statute effectively gave to nontendering
shareholders the power to veto a bid by denying voting rights, it would be a potent defensive
weapon indeed. In fact, however, it seems that the plebiscite of "disinterested" shareholders will
typically include tendering as well as nontendering shareholders.· Because only shares owned or
controlled by the bidder or by target insiders are excepted and the bidder generally will not have
purchased tendered shares by the plebiscite's record date, the stock of tendering shareholders can
be voted on the voting rights question. Accordingly, whenever a majority of "disinterested"
shares responds favorably to a tender offer, the nontendering shareholders' blocking power will
effectively be eliminated. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. at 73 n.2; see
also Cox, The Constitutional ''Dynamics" of the Internal Affairs Rule - A Comment on CTS
Corporation, 13 J. CORP. L. 317, 327 n.53, 328 n.56, 334 (1988).
22. See Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 261, 262-63 (7th Cir. 1986), revd. in
part, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). A recent empirical study argues that, while less than lethal, control
share acquisition statutes have nevertheless significantly diminished the success rate of hostile
bids for corporations subject to their protection. See Note, supra note 8, at 1219.
23. Cox, supra note 21, at 334. This article contains a brief but excellent appraisal of the
control share acquisition statute as an "investor protection" device. See id. at 332-35.
24. See Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L.
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broad coalition of organized labor and other nonbusiness interests, 25
while New York's business combination statute enjoyed organized labor's support,26 an unlikely .proxy for management interests. Even
where the legislative record suggests that business interests have sponsored legislation and labor and other community groups have played
no visible supporting role, it seems odd to assume that such interests
did not approve of the legislation27 or that the legislators simply ignored such broader policy concerns. In Connecticut, t~e state on
which Professor Romano has focused, labor was on record as favoring
plant-closing legislation,28 which may have led legislators to assume
that labor would support an antitakeover law as well. More generally,
it may often be the case that state legislators are responding to a broad
range of constituencies troubled by the takeover phenomenon, even
though such groups may choose to remain on the sidelines or are unable to participate in the legislative process because the costs of organizing and lobbying are simply too high. 29 In: letting local
companies bear the laboring oar, these groups act as rational political
"free riders." Finally, the simplistic equation of management sponsorship with selfish entrenchment motives may be questionable; at least
some corporate managers would dispute the suggestion that their actions are motivated solely by a desire to keep their jobs, lacking any
genuine regard for the welfare of those whose lives are affected by their
firms' activities.
Perhaps observers have lost sight of the real reasons for the business combination and control share acquisition statutes because of the
indirect way in which these laws approach their nonshareholder protection objectives. After all, some, like North Carolina's, actually
' style themselves shareholder protection statutes. 30 If limiting takeover
activity is the states' goal, why haven't they tried to do so directly, by
REv. 467, 470. Criticisms like this seem to be especially favored by members of the law and
economics school, who are congenitally hostile to any tampering with the "market for corporate
control" and, therefore, apparently unable to believe that thoughtful people of good faith could
possibly see things differently. See also Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and
the Market for Corporate Charters, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 365; Romano, The Political Economy of
Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987).
25. See Davis, Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988
WIS. L. REV. 491, 493-99.
26. See supra text accompanying note 18.
27. In Professor Coffee's words, "silence may imply consent." Coffee, The Uncertain Case
for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-ups, 1988 WIS. L. REv.
435, 437 n.8.
28. Romano, supra note 24, at 134 n.58.
29. See Coffee, supra note 27, at 437 n.8; Davis, supra note 25, at 498.
30. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-75(a) (Supp. 1988) ("The North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act").
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placing some kind of ban on takeovers deemed harmful to state residents? The reason, of course, is the need to disguise antitakeover laws
in the form of traditional corporation law. Following the Supreme
Court's MITE decision, 31 states sought to repackage their antitakeover efforts as traditional regulation of corporate internal affairs, imposing additional regulations on fundamental corporate changes, or
redefining the scope of voting rights. In other words, to preserve their
power to act in this vitally important area, states have "corporatized"
takeover law. Because that strategy succeeded in CTS, they may be
expected to continue using it. The ostensible focus on shareholders
and management, the traditional stuff of corporation law, should not,
however, blind one to the real objective, which has nothing at all to do
with advancing shareholder interests.
Given the triviality of the coercion problem, 32 no one can deny
that, at least in some respects, shareholders lose from takeover legislation. 33 Once commentators stop worrying so much about this question, perhaps they can begin to direct their energies to the much more
challenging questions that this type of legislation presents. First, more
evidence needs to be gathered about the actual effects of hostile takeovers on nonshareholders, and the amount of those losses needs to be
quantified in some meaningful way. The motivations behind present
takeover activity require further study. How significant are "bust-up"
objectives, bidder overpayment, share price discounts, and the tax-preferred status of debt financing? Do such goals accurately explain the
majority of hostile bids? To what extent do an effective market for
corporate control and its attendant benefits for shareholders necessitate nonshareholder losses?34
31. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
33. More precisely, no one doubts that target company shareholders lose from restrictions on
takeover activity. There is some evidence suggesting that bidder firms (and therefore their shareholders) sustain significant losses from takeovers, but that conclusion is questionable. See Macey, supra note 24, at 483-84. Professor Macey also argues that, even if bidder shareholders do
lose, gains to target shareholders outweigh such losses, yielding a net societal gain. Id. at 485. In
calculating net societal gain, Macey does not take nonshareholder losses into account because he
doesn't believe such losses occur with any significant frequency. In his view, even in those rare
cases where jobs are lost, workers elsewhere will be employed instead, so "overall national em·
ployment is unaffected." See id. at 478-79. Presumably the same argument would apply to the
various other ripple effects of plant closings. Perhaps state legislators may be forgiven their
inability to see jobs and other community benefits as merely fungible commodities that can be
transferred cost-free from state to state as long as there are no net losses.
34. One promising effort is a study concluding that the gains to target company shareholders
in the form of takeover premiums may in large part reflect losses by nonshareholders whose
expectations of continued relations with the target corporation have been violated by acceptance
of the takeover bid. See A. SHLIEFER & L. SUMMERS, BREACH OF TRUST IN HOSTILE TAKE·
OVERS (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2342, Aug. 1987).
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Second, beyond these empirical questions are problems of political
and legal theory. By seeking to protect nonshareholders at the expense of shareholders, the states make a potentially radical break with
the orthodox view that corporations should confine themselves to activity that maximizes the wealth of their shareholders. 35 At stake may
be a rethinking of the scope and function of corporation law and, at a
deeper level, a new vision of what corporations are - broad, interdependent networks of relationships rather than merely shareholdermanagement agency contracts - and their role in our society. 36
Booth's piece avoids confronting these deeper questions by instead
applying an analytical approach to takeover laws that is identical to
that employed by many corporation law scholars who have addressed
the basic anomaly characteristic of corporation statutes generally.
These scholars have reinterpreted what are clearly pro-management
enactments (despite their shareholder welfare pretensions) as being
only apparently so - as being in reality pro-shareholder laws because
of the extra-legal constraints imposed on broad managerial discretion
by well-functioning markets, including the market for corporate control. The historical motivations behind corporation statutes - to free
management from unduly restrictive legal regulation - are transformed by this "market model" of corporation law so that, ironically,
shareholders are better served by laxity than by some other more rigorous legal regime. While many market model scholars have been
deeply troubled by takeover statutes and the way in which they "gum
up" the market for corporate control in particular and, more generally, the market explanation for the content of corporation law, Booth
has sought to explain even these laws in pro-shareholder terms. By his
analytical alchemy, he would convert legal "lead" to market "gold."
In so doing, Booth preserves intact the existing shareholder-centered
mode of corporation law discourse. Not only is his approach flawed as
a matter of statutory analysis; it ignores the fundamental uncertainty
about the nature and objectives of corporate activity that simmers below the surface of state takeover legislation. Thus, such analysis
threatens to submerge the nascent - and so understandably nai:Ve and
tentative - rethinking of these first-order issues.
35. Radical though these developments may appear to some, the use of corporation la"'. to
protect those thought to be particularly vulnerable to corporate activity, rather than solely to
promote shareholder financial interests, coincides with nineteenth-century ideas about corporation law's appropriate function, ideas that were only jettisoned during the early decades of this
century. See Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 903 (1988).
36. See generally Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?, 43
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781 (1986).
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In addressing basic political questions like these, it is necessary to
decide the appropriate role for the states in their resolution. Are such
matters better addressed locally, or is a uniform federal policy desirable in this area? If addressed by the states through legislation like
present takeover laws, how can such laws really work absent express
legislative attention to developments in common law rules that seem to
push in the opposite direction?37 ·
Finally, in addition to empirical and political issues, vexing questions of constitutional doctrine are implicated. No doubt more will be
said on behalf of the view that the Williams Act already preempts
efforts by the states to regulate takeover activity. 38 Such claims are
also driven by a market approach to corporation law and economic
organization, an approach that, ironically, would use federal securities
regulation to deregulate the market for corporate control. As an argument about legislative intent, however, the preemption claim is almost
transparently phony. 39 More troubling are arguments to the effect
that the dormant commerce clause prevents the states from protecting
resident nonshareholders at the expense of nonresident shareholders
- that capital markets are quintessentially interstate commerce and
the interests of those (shareholders) who participate in those markets
are constitutionally preferred over those who deal locally with corporations in other ways. Assuming that the states resolve the empirical
and theoretical questions in favor of continued efforts to restrict takeovers, we suspect that this doctrinal question will serve as the arena
within which the success or failure of those efforts will ultimately be
decided.
All of these difficult questions of fact, policy, and doctrine are only
beginning to receive the serious attention that they deserve. 40 Preoccupation with the economic effects of state legislation on shareholders
37. For an argument that Delaware's common Jaw of defensive tactics is increasingly em·
bracing the shareholder primacy vision of corporate purpose, a vision that likely will prevail over
the broader objectives of state takeover legislation, see Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between
Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. L. 35 (1988). In
effect, the task of resolving the complex issues of corporate governance and purpose in American
society has fallen to the Delaware judiciary rather than to the several state (or federal)
legislatures.
38. The SEC has identified this preemption campaign - targeted particularly at Delaware's
statute - as a "top priority." See 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1176 (July 22, 1988) (state·
ments of Daniel Goelzer, SEC General Counsel).
39. See Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act (forthcoming). The arguments now
being advanced with respect to preemption of state statutes would, if accepted, apply with equal
force to state common law sanctioning defensive tactics. See Johnson & Millon, Does the Wil·
liams Act Preempt State Common Law in Hostile Takeovers?, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 339 (1989).
40. In addition to the Shliefer & Summers paper, supra note 34, see Coffee, supra note 27,
and Davis, supra note 25. On the commerce clause question, see Gergen, Territoriality and the
Perils of Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1735 (1988); Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v.
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not only misses the point of what the states are trying to do; it diverts
attention from far more important - and far more challenging concerns.

Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State
Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865 (1987).

